Abstract. In this paper, the subsidies accruing to owner-occupiers in the Newcastle travel-towork area (TTWA) for the period 1985-87 is examined. Data at the micro level from two building societies are used to produce estimates of the impact of mortgage-interest tax relief at source and the nontaxation of imputed rent. The overall level of subsidy is shown to have fallen through time and the greatest relative subsidies are given to households with the smallest taxable income. The effect of the income elasticity of demand for housing on subsidy levels is considered and an estimate of the income elasticity of demand is produced for the Newcastle TTWA. Finally, some spatial effects of housing subsidies are discussed.
Introduction
In this paper, we present a study of the owner-occupier housing market in the Newcastle upon Tyne travel-to-work area (TTWA) between 1985 and 1987 . The focus of the study is on public finance and subsidies towards owner-occupiers. Subsidies represent an attempt to bridge the gap between housing cost and ability to pay. They have also been one of the factors explaining the rise in owneroccupation (Black and Stafford, 1988) .
Existing studies on subsidies to owner-occupier housing, in the form of mortgageinterest tax relief and nontaxation of imputed rent and capital gains, are becoming dated and have tended to rely on secondary sources of data. Robinson's (1981) pioneering study was based on data gathered for 1977 to compare with the Department of the Environment's (DoE, 1977) housing policy review. Ermisch (1984) also undertook a review and theoretical analysis based on published data from such sources as the Family Expenditure Survey as well as known variables such as taxation rates, and so on, to estimate subsidies. Others (for example, Black and Stafford, 1988) have relied on dividing inland-revenue and building-society figures of tax relief on mortgages by the number of borrowers to derive an average tax-relief figure per borrower. But some researchers using these data sources (for example, Kearns and Maclennan, 1989) , although calculating subsidies from tax relief on interest payments and nontaxation of imputed capital gains, have not included subsidy from nontaxation of imputed rents.
In this paper, we use actual data on individual mortgage applications granted by the Halifax and Nationwide building societies between 1985 and 1987, to estimate subsidies from tax relief and nontaxation of imputed rent. Although this procedure does not permit the cost of subsidies to the public exchequer for the whole owneroccupier sector to be estimated, it does reflect the situation on the margin. Only residential properties bought and sold between 1985 and 1987 are included in the sample. Thus, we provide estimates of exchequer subsidies on the margin, which for many policy purposes could be superior to the average estimates derived by taking total tax relief and dividing by the number of mortgages. The latter will produce a lower estimate of government subsidies per household than an assessment of tax relief on mortgage interest to recent house purchasers. Like rent pooling in the local authority sector, average costs produce a misleading estimate of marginal costs and subsidies.
The subsidy from capital gains has not been estimated in this paper. It is not possible to calculate the incidence of capital gains at the level of the individual house, with the data employed in this study. The incidence of capital gains at the individual house level can be determined if the market price of the same dwelling is available at two points in time. There were insufficient numbers of houses in the data set which had been bought and sold twice in the time period. Even if a second valuation had been estimated, through some hedonic price index (Fleming and Nellis, 1985b) , capital gains are sensitive to the time period chosen, as Robinson (1981) observed. Estimates also vary depending on whether the gains are calculated annually or only when the gain is realised. Capital gains are sensitive to the type of dwelling and local geographical areas. Thus, problems arise if average house prices in an area are used to calculate capital gains, in that assumptions must be made about the composition of the housing stock from year to year, and there must be sufficient observations in the geographical area. It would be necessary to assume that in each area the composition of the housing stock being sold and the intra-area and interarea demand remain constant in each year. The breakdown of individual mortgage transactions (table 2) shows that this is an unreasonable assumption. Moreover, for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 , average house prices in North England were £22 784, £24333, and £27275, respectively. Thus, house prices increased at a rate of 9% (compound) over the three-year period; compared with a 5% annual compound increase in the Retail Price Index. This is not a dramatic capital gain compared with those experienced in South East England, and hence not a significant omission in total household subsidies from housing in the Newcastle TTWA.
Our purpose in this paper is to (1) provide a reasonably up-to-date assessment of the magnitude of public subsidies towards owner-occupiers, in terms of tax relief on mortgage interest and of nontaxation of imputed rent on housing; (2) investigate the distribution of these subsidies across income groups and other groups; and (3) assess the demand for owner-occupier housing, and hence the likely growth in these subsidies in the future.
The study area lies at one end of the UK housing-market spectrum. House prices in Tyneside are amongst the lowest in the United Kingdom, with a slow rate of growth in prices, a lower proportion of owner-occupier households (45% compared with 58% in England and Wales), and a corresponding higher proportion of councilhouse tenants (41% compared with 29% of households in England and Wales). Any interaction between tenures in terms of effects on house prices and incomes is not modelled in this paper: the study is a static analysis of subsidies towards owneroccupation. Public expenditure on and foregone tax from owner-occupier housing in Tyneside is thus likely to be towards the lower end of the subsidy-per-unit (house or family) scale: subsidies towards owner-occupation in other regions are likely to be much greater.
Data
The data used in the analysis in this paper are based on all mortgage applications granted by the Nationwide and Halifax building societies for the period 1985-87 in the Newcastle TTWA. The TTWA is defined by the postcodes NE1-NE13, NE15-NE21, NE25-NE30, NE39-NE43, NE47, DH2, and DH7-DH9.
The validity of using such data sets to investigate the level of government subsidy to the owner-occupier sector and the demand implications depends upon the representativeness of the data set and the adjustments that must be made to make results comparable between data sets. The variability of estimates increases as the sample size falls. Thus, the greater the disaggregation of the data into subcategories (such as house type, income category, and so on) the greater the variability. The Nationwide data set is likely to suffer the greatest variations because it has only 743, 644, and 457 data points, respectively, for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 . The Halifax data set is much larger and has 3691, 3909, and 3158 observations, respectively. The advantages of disaggregation are thus offset to a certain extent by the disadvantages of an increased sample error.
Clearly the 'mix' of the type of houses and buyers that each mortgage agency attracts are important factors in the data. In any year, especially for a small area such as a postcode area, the number of different types of property sold may vary. This affects the demand model, subsidy levels, and representativeness of the building-society sample for housing in the area as a whole. The proportion of each housing type tends to vary between building societies. There is usually an even greater discrepancy between insurance companies and building societies. Price indices based on the characteristics of the homes can be produced (Fleming and Nellis, 1985a; 1985b) , but the robustness of such estimates depends upon the functional form chosen, the variables used, and the level of measurement errors in the variables. It was decided that as a result, any gain from such indices was not sufficient to offset the effort required to produce them.
The representativeness of the building-society data as a reflection of the Newcastle TTWA housing market is of prime importance. Other financial institutions fund a widely varying proportion of the market. Nationally, for instance, the banks' share varied between 2% and 36% during the period 1972-82. Banks and insurance companies tend to lend 'up-market' and local authorities tend to lend 'down-market'. However, as the building societies are the major lenders of money to home buyers, and the number of 'up-market' properties is limited in the Newcastle TTWA, building-society mortgage data are reasonably representative of the underlying structure of the market.
A factor which may cause an upwards bias in the average price levels reported, and thus the average levels of subsidy received, may occur where a building society has differential rates which favour large loans. Societies operating differential rates will attract more of the business at the top end of the market, which will inflate reported prices. The Nationwide offered such a system in 1984 (Fleming and Nellis, 1985a) . Differential rates have been scrapped and reintroduced on a number of occasions in the last few years. Their effect is thus indeterminate.
Both data sets are based on the time at which a mortgage is approved. The proportion of transactions at below the market price was available for the Nationwide data sets. Unfortunately no such information was available at an individual-transaction level from the Halifax. Four data points were removed because of excessively low prices resulting from the need for extensive renovation. In fact 13.3%, 12.3%, and 12.7% of Nationwide transactions in 1985, 1986, and 1987 , respectively, were below the estimated 'market price'. Of these 44%, 35%, and 38% respectively were sales to local authority tenants. In table 1 the price paid as a proportion of the surveyors valuations for a number of different groupings are shown. During the period 1985-87 council dwellings sold at about 55% of the market price; for noncouncil sales below market price, the price of dwellings was about 80% of their valuation. As valuations are reasonably accurate predictions of the selling price of dwellings, they are used as a proxy for price in the calculation of imputed rent for the Nationwide data. Because information is not available for the Halifax transactions estimates of subsidy from nontaxation of imputed rent and therefore overall subsidies will be subject to downward bias. Analysis of the Nationwide estimates of the imputed rent indicate that the largest downward bias in the subsidy is likely to be in respect of low-income groups and at the 'bottom end' of the price range. It should be noted that measurement at the approval stage has the disadvantage of including some cases for which mortgage loans were approved and then either cancelled or amended. This method does, however, give a more up-to-date estimate of house prices.
The representativeness of the data can be judged from the characteristics of houses and households that compose the sample data. These characteristics allow judgements about the appropriateness of constant interarea and intra-area demand to be made for the period 1985-87. Table 2 gives some indicators of the comparability of the data from the two building societies between 1985 and 1987. In general the Nationwide has a smaller proportion of head of households under 30 years old compared with the Halifax and a slightly higher proportion of 30-40 year old heads of households. For both building societies a high proportion of households have no children. The average household income in the Halifax data tends to be smaller than that of the Nationwide. This may be a result of the higher proportion of first-time buyers in the Halifax data, which may also account for the increase in average income seen between 1986 and 1987 of the Halifax data set, as the proportion of first time buyers fell in 1987. In real terms (figures in parentheses) incomes stay at a similar level thoughout the three-year period. Last, for each year the average prices paid for dwellings are compatible between the two societies and in real terms the price of houses has remained reasonably static. Overall, the two data sets are reasonably compatible although the Halifax data exhibit a slightly higher proportion of first-time buyers and head of households under 30-years old than the Nationwide. 3 Subsidy 3.1 Methodology Housing is both a consumption and an investment good. If the incidence of subsidy and tax expenditure is to be considered, there must be some benchmark against which to measure the impact. The benchmark chosen was that provided by the standard UK tax and pricing principles. If housing is considered to be only a consumption good then the subsidy accruing to owner-occupiers is the tax relief on mortgage payments, or mortgage-interest tax relief at source (MIRAS). If housing is also an investment good then the nontaxation of imputed rent and capital gains are also subsidies to owner-occupiers (Robinson, 1981) . Unfortunately, the nature of the building-society data set analysed here does not allow us to measure accurately the subsidy from nontaxation of capital gains.
The extent to which capitalisation of subsidies takes place is dependent upon the supply elasticity of housing. If capitalisation does take place it may do so at different rates for properties of different values. If it was possible to more accurately estimate capitalisation, together with estimates of demand elasticities, a more comprehensive estimate of subsidy incidence could be obtained. However, such information is not available at present. In this paper, we will examine the different levels of subsidy accruing to first-time purchasers and owner-occupiers who have moved, which we hope will give an indication of how subsidy levels change as households' consumption of housing increases.
MIRAS can be claimed on the interest payments made on the first £30000 of a mortgage. Mortgagees pay reduced interest payments and the building societies claim the difference in interest payments from the exchequer. In order for us to calculate the level of subsidy for individual households a number of assumptions had to be made.
First, all of each repayment was assumed to be an interest payment. That is, it was assumed that all mortgages taken out were endowment mortgages. Information on the type of mortgage at the level of individual transactions is only available for the Nationwide data. Analysis indicates that 39.7%, 54.4%, and 76.0% for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 , respectively, were endowment mortgages. The mean price of endowment and nonendowment mortgages by dwelling price and household taxable income were produced. Results indicate that through time there was a shift out of the cheapest house-group for both mortgage types, which may be an effect of inflation. However, they do not indicate a significant difference between prices for endowment and nonendowment mortgages. There is a small increase in the proportion of endowment mortgages as prices rise. The importance of the assumption of endowment mortgages is reduced by the marginal nature of the analysis, in that for the first few years a very large proportion of the repayments are interest payments. The assumption will lead to a small upward bias in estimates of MIRAS. However, analysis incidates that the bias does not vary significantly as prices and incomes rise or between years. Thus, as the complicated nature of the repayment mortgages in terms of how much is paid in interest each year makes it very difficult to calculate subsidies, the endowment assumption of mortgages is retained.
Second, it must be assumed that it is reasonable to use an annual average interest rate for each of the years. The average rates used in this analysis are from Building Society Association "Bulletin 55" (BSA, 1988) . Tax regimes for financial years were applied to the calendar year format of the data sets. The annual income of buyers was obtained by multiplying their gross income by 52 if only weekly gross income levels were available.
Third, assumptions must also be made about the tax system. It was assumed that where a house purchaser was self-employed, declared income was taxed at the same rate and at the same thresholds as employees. This assumption is necessary because no information was available as to which of the buyers were self-employed. It was also assumed that if a husband and wife were taxed jointly then the wife's taxable income could be added to the husband's for tax purposes. MIRAS is then available at the joint marginal rate of income tax. Up to July 1988 tax relief could be claimed on £30000 per mortgagee if the mortgagees were taxed separately. After this date, relief on only £30000 per mortgage was available. A separate analysis is made of those who received multiple MIRAS in subsection 3.2. Last, it was assumed that all the houses purchased were the first home of the buyers and not a second home: mortgagees must live in their house to qualify for MIRAS.
The level of tax relief per household (T max ) is calculated as ymax __ P 1 -^ -1 , if A < £30000*,
where A is the total advance, t mr is the marginal rate of income tax, P l is the value of the interest payments per year if A < £30 000%, P 2 is the value of interest payments per year if A > £30000%, and % is 1 if there is no joint ownership and is equal to 2 if there is joint ownership. The payments due, at the full rate of interest, P 1 and P 2 are
and
where r 1 is the annual interest rate. Imputed rent is the rental value of the housing services, which are consumed as a flow of services from the dwelling considered as a capital asset, that is, it is an imputed income to the owner-occupier. A number of methodological problems must be overcome in order to produce a reasonable estimate of the subsidy from nontaxation of imputed rent. Working definitions of imputed rent and the subsidy attributable from the nontaxation of such rent are required. The definition of imputed rent adopted in this study is
where R is the imputed rent, V is the market valuation, m is the outstanding mortgage, and r d is the annual discount rate. The subsidy from imputed rent, S, is given by
The definition of imputed rent rests on two assumptions. First, there is no capitalisation in house prices; that is, it is assumed that house prices are not influenced by current levels of tax relief. If capitalisation takes place, then the impact of subsidy becomes difficult to measure, as it would require speculation about what the price would be if there were no governmental interference. The level of capitalisation is unlikely to remain constant through time; as the price rises it induces higher levels of subsidy which are themselves capitalised into house prices. O'Sullivan (1984) and Robinson (1981) consider this problem in more detail. No capitalisation implies that the supply of housing is completely elastic, so that any increase in demand produced by the subsidy is instantly offset by increases in supply. This is not a very realistic assumption. However, the production of estimates of the level of capitalisation has proved notoriously difficult, and no satisfactory estimates yet exist. But unless some estimate of imputed rent is produced, subsidies to the owner-occupier sector will be an unduly restricted set. The capitalisation assumption allows the analysis of imputed rent to be undertaken. Second, it is assumed that the imputed rent must be positive, that is, no refunds are permitted where the market valuation is less than the outstanding mortgage.
The capital value of a dwelling to its owner, in terms of its market price minus mortgage, is at its lowest when it has just been purchased. Thus, the level of imputed rent and hence the subsidy on this source of 'income' will be underestimated for the owner-occupier sector in general by the use of building society data. If possible, the effect of some purchases being below the market price has to be taken into consideration. This was possible for the Nationwide data but not for the Halifax data, which may cause a small downward bias in the Halifax subsidy estimates. An estimate of the overall bias introduced can be provided by looking at the repayment-to-income ratio for the United Kingdom as a whole (CSO, 1989b, table 8.14) against that for the two data sets. The repayment-to-income ratio for the sample data is repayment , ,
w .
x MIRAS = (advance) (mortgage interest rate) -income household income
The opportunity cost of owner-occupation is assumed to be the real rate of return that can be made by alternative risk-free forms of investment. The real rate of return from a national savings account was used as a measure of such a discount rate. Thus, = nominal rate -(basic tax rate) (nominal rate) -retail price index. of return r
Estimates
The figures in parentheses in tables 3 to 5 indicate the level of subsidy accruing to households at 1985 prices. A GDP (gross domestic product) deflator at market prices is used (CSO, 1989a, table 2, column 1). If the value in 1985 is 100, then the value of the deflator is 103.5 in 1986, and 108.5 in 1987. Table 3 shows the total amount of subsidy per household accruing as a result of MIRAS and nontaxation of imputed rent by house price for each data set. The MIRAS calculations use interest rates of 13.47%, 12.07%, and 11.64%, respectively, for the years 1985, 1986, and 1987 . The discount rates used to produce the level of imputed rent are 3.0%, 4.1%, and 4.3%, respectively. The sample repayment-toincome ratio is stable throughout the period at about 0.13, whereas for the United Kingdom in 1985 and 1986 it is 0.18. This indicates that the market value minus the outstanding mortgage on the dwelling may be as much as 38% lower in this data set of housing transactions than it is amongst owner-occupiers as a whole.
Figures adjusted to take account of this are still within one standard deviation of the average subsidy. Table 3 shows that as the price of a dwelling rises so does the amount of subsidy it attracts, as might be expected a priori. There are only two exceptions to this in the Nationwide data and none in the Halifax. The rate at which the level of subsidy increases with price is approximately the same for all three years. The percentage increase in subsidy between the bands falls as price rises. The level of subsidy has slowly been falling through time. The deflated results indicate a greater fall in subsidy than the raw figures suggest. The overall level of subsidy in 1987 is between 59% (for £80000 to £100000 dwellings from the Nationwide) and 89% (for £60000 to £80000 dwellings from the Nationwide) of its 1985 level, with most bands suffering a fall of between 20% and 30%. Other studies by their nature have not been able to produce a breakdown of subsidy by price. The rate of increase in subsidy falls off between the tax bands, which probably reflects the effects of the £30000 limit per mortgagee that applied during the period 1985-87, and continues effectively to constrain such subsidy levels.
In table 4, a breakdown is given of the total subsidy accruing to households by their household income. The income measure used is the combined annual taxable income of the main and any second applicant. Both MIRAS and imputed rent have been calculated on this basis. There is a particularly large jump between those paying the basic rate of tax, having a taxable income of less than £16 200 in 1985 for instance, and those on the next tax rate. Subsidy levels for the 40% tax band are between 211% and 248% of those for households paying the basic rate. Nat., Nationwide data; Hal., Halifax data. Note: tax relief in parentheses are GDP-deflated to 1985 prices to permit comparison exclusive of inflation. Nat., Nationwide data; Hal., Halifax data. Note: tax relief in parentheses are GDP-deflated to 1985 prices to permit comparison exclusive of inflation.
The increase in subsidy between the other tax bands is somewhat smaller. This is partly because of the fact that as incomes rise the exchequer grants increased tax relief on mortgage interest: tax relief on mortgage interest is regressive, benefiting those with higher incomes. Deflated results indicate that subsidy levels in 1987 were about 80% of those in 1985 and that there was no significant difference between the two data sets or between income groups. Table 5 shows that although most types of dwelling obtain a subsidy, it is actually falling through time both in absolute terms and relatively if inflation is taken into account. Only for semidetached bungalows and purpose-built flats between 1985 and 1986 for the Nationwide data do subsidies increase. Similarly, in the Halifax data the subsidy on dwellings converted to flats increased between 1985 and 1986 . For the years 1985 , 1986 .5%, 11%, and 9.8% of Nationwide transactions and 17%, 17%, and 16% of Halifax transactions, respectively, called forth multiple MIRAS relief. Results indicate that those who received multiple MIRAS were at the bottom end of the owner-occupier housing market, with at least 92% of Nationwide transactions (94% of Halifax) being for dwellings of under £40000 and for only one sale for over £60000 in the three-year period for the Nationwide (nine sales in the Halifax). Except for dwellings under £20000 in 1987 for the Nationwide (when relief was 10% less than the overall average) the average multiple relief for different price bands was between 3% and 47% more than the overall group average. Only those in the lowest income band received more than average subsidy.
Over the period, first-time buyers accounted for 45%, 48%, and 46% of Nationwide and 57%, 58%, and 45% of Halifax transactions. In all three years they received more average subsidy for dwellings in the £20000 to £60000 range. The only exception was for the Halifax in 1987 when they received less in the £20000 to In all three years, and for all income bands, first-time buyers receive less subsidy than existing owner-occupiers moving house, by between 12% (for the £17 200 to £20200 income band for the Halifax in 1987) to 87% (for the £25 400 to £33 300 income band for the Nationwide in 1986), with about 30% being a reasonable overall figure. As a whole, the results indicate that first-time buyers receive less subsidy for the different dwelling types than existing owner-occupiers who move house. Results indicate that the more income a buyer has and the greater the individual household's consumption of housing the greater the level of subsidy they receive. The rate of increase in subsidy, however, falls slightly as the price of the dwelling increases. In addition, a general falling off of the level of subsidy is apparent over the period 1985-87, by about 20%. This reflects the effects of falling tax rates, which calls forth smaller subsidies and the £30000 limit per mortgagee, which becomes more important as house prices rise. Analysis of the subsidy-to-income ratio is given in section 5 on 'policy implications'. Results indicate that multiple MIRAS may have been used as a way of financing entry into the owner-occupier market for low-income and first-time buyers. Analysis of first-time buyers and existing owner-occupier movers indicates that existing owner-occupiers who move tend to demand a higher level of housing in a given income range and receive more in subsidies. This is probably a result of the effects of capital gains from the sale of previous dwellings.
Demand

Methodology
Future changes in mortgage interest subsidies and nontaxation of imputed rent are likely to depend upon future changes in demand for and price of housing. Most authors have produced demand functions for housing which are very similar in form. A typical function produced by Goodman and Kawai (1984) is
J
where Q is the quantity of housing, Y is a measure of income, p is the price of housing, Zj represents other socioeconomic factors, i is a cross-sectional individual, U t is a disturbance term for individual /, and a, /3, y, and d are parameters. In this section, we estimate the income elasticity of demand, which shows the rate of growth of demand as income changes, to provide some indication of how the level of subsidy might grow in the future as demand rises. A Byatt-Holmans type model was used to produce estimates of the intracity income elasticity of demand for housing (Byatt et al, 1972) . The functional form of their model is
where, again, p is house price, Y is current income of the head of the household, z t are dummy variables, and a, b, and Q are parameters. Thus, the reduced form of the model is \np = a + b\nY+C 1 z 1 +...+ C n z n .
The dummy variables used in this paper are used to consider four categorical variables to give a measure of the quality of the dwelling and the household: its age, the age of the head of the household, number of children, and whether the buyer has previously owned a house. Thus, the 'baseline' model is 1920 and 1944 and between 1945 and 1964, respectively; K°9 K\ and K 2 are the number of households with no children, one child, and two children, respectively; H° is a measure of if the head of the household was previously an owner-occupier; H <3° indicates the head of the household is under 30 years old, and H 30~40 indicates the head of the household is aged between 30 and 40 years; u is a vector of independent and identically distributed random-error terms; a is an intercept term, which indicates the expected price a household must pay for a house which was built after 1964, which has more than two children, the owners of which were not previously owner-occupiers and whose head is over 40 years old, if the income of the household is zero; a, b, c, d , e, /, g, h, k, /, and q are parameters.
The use of current income has been found to produce a biased estimate of the income elasticity of demand. Goodman and Kawai (1984) have shown that the coefficient of estimated income for current incomes lies between the true coefficient of transitory income and the coefficient of permanent income. The problem can be alleviated to a certain extent by use of the income of the head of the household whose income is likely to be less transitory than the overall household income. A more complicated approach used by Goodman (1988) and others is to use hedonics to produce a measure of permanent income. However, as mentioned earlier, the production of hedonics may be subject to a number of errors and methodological problems, and in this analysis we have not attempted to use such a technique. Estimates by DeLeeuw (1971) and others indicate that the use of current income may underestimate the income elasticity of demand by up to 50%.
The use of market value as an indicator of the bundle of housing services has also been criticised. It could be argued that consumer theory indicates that the expense per unit of time should be used as a proxy for demand. There is also evidence that the market value is not a stable proportion of the capital value of the dwelling, that is, it falls as a proportion of price, as price rises. The effect of transaction costs must also be noted as they distort the ability of a homeowner to change the level of 'housing services' that he or she consumes in response to changes in income and other socioeconomic factors.
In an attempt to quantify the problem of 'bias' a 'top-limit' value for the income elasticity of demand for housing is produced. This is accomplished by fitting a regression of the form lnY= a + b\np + cA 1 If the relationship between income and housing expenditure is an exact one then the estimate of the b coefficient produced in equations (4) and (5) will be identical. This is unlikely to be the case in practice, so the value of b produced by equation (5) provides a 'top-limit' value of the income elasticity of demand. In short, the work undertaken over the last two decades has shown that tight and accurate estimates of the income elasticity of demand are very difficult to produce. Studies of the sort considered here tend to produce downward biased results. This does not mean however that they do not give an indication of the demand relationships which occur within the owner-occupied housing sector.
Estimates
The results of the demand regressions for the Newcastle TTWA for the two building societies for the three-year period are presented in table 6. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. The variables which are common to all the models are lnY, A 1 , and H°. A 2 is common to all but one model. When making comparisons between the years it should be noted that inflation was in evidence over the period. As the price of the dwelling increases an increase in the marginal prices of the dwelling attributes is to be expected. In this paper we have not considered pooled data, as the main emphasis is on estimation of income elasticity of demand and housing characteristics within each year. The coefficient of lnY indicates that the income elasticity of demand has values of between 0.57 and 0.63. The income elasticity falls slightly through the period. The results for the income elasticity of demand, D Y , in table 6 give an estimate of the income elasticity if the results are downward biased by 50% (1.5 InY coefficient). Similarly, the highest values of D Y ('top Z) Y ' row in table 6) give estimates of the upper-limit value for the income elasticity of demand for housing in the Newcastle TTWA. Even if a 50% bias exists it can still be concluded that the demand for housing is income inelastic in the Newcastle TTWA. The estimates produced for the two data sets are consistent with results produced by other authors. Harmon (1988) considered the results of a large number of studies produced mainly in the USA. Rosenthal (1989) used UK data from a sample survey of building-society mortgages, which provided more than 200000 observations. Using individual observations he estimated the income elasticity of demand to be between 0.70 and 0.75. His grouped data specification produced an elasticity of demand of between 0.8 and 0.9. Most studies indicate an income elasticity in the range 0.6 to 0.9.
A number of dummy variables are significant for all the models. The coefficient of H°, which indicates how much extra is paid by owner-occupiers moving house compared with first-time buyers is smaller for the Halifax than for the Nationwide data. The results indicate a coefficient of between 0.35 and 0.40 overall. Thus, for instance, ceteris paribus, for a household whose head is earning £200 per week, there is an average price differential of 3.2% between houses purchased by previous owner-occupiers and first-time buyers for the Halifax data in 1985.
The age variables provide a measure of the depreciation in the value of the housing stock. Although the data are available as a continuous function, it was decided to use dummy variables for groupings of years. This was done because the Table 6 . Newcastle travel-to-work area-demand regressions. Hal., Halifax data; Nat., Nationwide data. ) also has little effect on demand for housing.
Policy implications
The large cost of the housing subsidy given by the government to owner-occupiers in the form of MIRAS and nontaxation of imputed rent has obvious policy implications. The incidence of such subsidies will be different in different areas. How the incidence of subsidy alters with changes in income can be of major importance to the individual, the region, and the government.
The estimates derived in the previous section on demand indicate that if the income of an individual increases by 10% this demand and therefore price of housing will rise by about 6% (for unadjusted estimates) or by 9% (for the adjusted estimate). As long as such an increase does not alter the tax band of an individual, the level of subsidy such an individual receives will increase by a similar amount. Table 3 indicates that increased house prices can cause subsidy levels to increase by considerable amounts. Thus, the cost to the government of subsidising owneroccupation is to some extent dependent on the income elasticity of demand for housing. In areas where the demand for housing, and therefore prices, are high, the subsidy level is high. In areas where demand is low, possibly as a result of low incomes or an unfavourable mix of housing, the subsidy level is low. Thus, the smallest amount of subsidy accrues to areas which have the oldest housing, or terraced houses, or flats. The policy implication of this analysis, then, is that the present government system gives the most subsidy to those areas which exhibit the largest economic growth, have the highest demand elasticity of housing, and whose housing stock is the newest.
An example may illustrate the effect of rising demand on the impact of subsidies. Consider a situation in which a man moves into a dwelling costing £28000 in year 1. The interest rate being charged on mortgages is 11% and the standard tax rate is 25%. He takes out an 80% mortgage and his opportunity cost of capital is 3%. After eight years he decides to move. In those eight years his income has increased at 4% pa. Thus, if he earned £10000 in year 1, by year 8 he would be earning £13 700 pa. As his income elasticity of demand is approximately 0.6 he will demand a dwelling valued at £30220. Thus, the subsidies gained by him, the The MIRAS in year 8 has been constrained to this level by the £30000 ceiling imposed on eligibility for tax relief. The increase in subsidy levels is 7.2%, that is, a compound rate of 0.9% pa. However, for a house costing only £20000 in year 1 the level of subsidy is £763 pa, and is £849 pa after moving in year 8. The increase in subsidy here is 11%, that is, a rate of 1.4%.
The microdata used in this analysis allows the breakdown of subsidy impact into any number of groups. Such a breakdown is a major advantage of the analysis undertaken in this paper. In figure 1 , the subsidy-to-income ratio for the Halifax data plotted against the income of an individual is shown. The graph has been produced by calculating the average subsidy levels for individual heads of households by taxable income in £2000 bands. A similar analysis of the Nationwide data set has not been undertaken owing to an insufficient number of data points. Figure 1 reveals a sharp decline in the relative level of subsidy as income rises in all three years for individuals paying the basic rate of tax. As might be expected, those individuals with the smallest taxable incomes gain the greatest relative subsidy. For very high levels of income the subsidy is more variable. This is partly owing to the small number of observations in each cell. The 1986 and 1987 results show that the level of subsidy begins to rise again as an individual moves into higher tax bands. It then drops off again for very high incomes. Overall, the 1986 and 1987 results are very similar, although 1987 exhibits slightly smaller subsidy levels than 1986. Both years exhibit lower subsidy levels on average than 1985. The subsidyto-income ratio begins to increase at a value of about £15 000 and, except for a drop at about the £23000 level in 1986, it rises until an income of £29000 is reached. The subsidy-to-income ratio then falls to about 0.12. The 1985 results differ from the 1986 and 1987 results in that the increase-in-subsidy ratio begins at £13 000 and begins to fall at about £23000. Here the increase is much less marked and the subsidy-to-income ratio falls to about 0.13 for very high incomes.
In the Newcastle TTWA, two subareas were considered. Dwellings to the north of the river were allocated to one group, and those to the south to another. A dummy for the north was incorporated in the demand regression. In all six regressions this dummy was significant, indicating that housing prices were higher in the north of the TTWA than the south. An overall coefficient of about 0.12 was indicated for the north dummy. Thus, for instance, for an otherwise identical house (with the head earning £200 per week) the price differential between the north and south of the TTWA for the Nationwide data in 1985 is 1.2%. As a result the north receives higher subsidy levels than the south. If the subsidy levels are capitalised, the gap in house prices widens, thus reinforcing the demand gap. A similar situation may well exist between the north and south of the country as a whole, with the South East of England obtaining the most subsidy, which in itself may lead to further discrepancies in prices between the north and the south of Britain.
Conclusions
The results from the analysis in this paper show that the incidence of subsidy increases with price and income. It also varies among different types of dwellings. The level of subsidy per household fell slightly between the years 1985 and 1987 in the Newcastle TTWA. Work has not been undertaken to produce estimates of the subsidy from nontaxation of capital gains because of inherent difficulties of standardising for the house and time-span of capital appreciation. Figure 1 gives some indication of which income groups are being targeted most. Individuals who are at the top end of the basic tax rate receive the least subsidy relative to their income. In general, once higher rates of tax are paid, subsidy levels rise.
Estimates of the income elasticity of demand varied between 0.57 and 0.63 over the three-year period for the two data sets. The estimates indicated a small decline through time. If a bias of 50% is present in the estimates, then an income elasticity of between 0.86 and 0.95 is indicated. However, it can be concluded that the j demand for housing in the Newcastle TTWA is income inelastic. One of the major advantages of the approach adopted in this paper to estimating the demand for housing is that it allows us to look at the effect of the house and household characteristics on demand and therefore at the subsidies on an individual household level. Houses built before 1919 and purchased by first-time buyers attract much lower prices and therefore much less subsidy than those built after 1964 and purchased by previous owner-occupiers. For example, in 1985 for the Halifax data, the average price for post-1964 houses bought by buyers who were previously owner-occupiers was 7.6% higher than for pre-1919 houses bought by first-time buyers.
The north/south divide of the city is such that the less 'attractive' south side of the city obtains less subsidy than the north. This may partially explain the gap which exists at the moment. It may also indicate that the gap will widen in the future as incomes increase, and hence subsidies will increase and be capitalised into house prices. This may also have taken place in the country as a whole with the rise in prices in the south calling forth more subsidy, thus allowing prices to rise further. If the income elasticity of demand is higher in the south than the north of Britain, this will exacerbate house price differentials. This in turn may cause prices and subsidies to rise faster in the south than in the north even if incomes grow at the same rate in the two areas.
The decline in interest tax relief in real terms since 1985 is consistent with the findings of Kearns and Maclennan (1989) who used aggregate national data. However, the average value of MIRAS to households based on all mortgages from aggregate data [estimated as £580 pa in 1987/88 (Sharp et al, 1989) , and as £490 pa in 1987/88 (Kearns and Maclennan, 1989) ] is only half of the average subsidy based on new mortgages granted in our sample.
Overall, the government policy of subsidising owner-occupation leads, in the static equilibrium framework adopted here, to a sizeable reduction in the cost of housing in this tenure to homeowners. In this paper it is shown clearly that in the owner-occupier housing market, individuals do not incur the same subsidy per unit as any other individual, because of the way the market works and the way that tax relief is organised. The size of the subsidy is greatest in areas of high demand with the most preferable mix of housing. An income elasticity of demand of about 0.6 is indicated, which has considerable implications for the level of subsidy which will occur as prices and incomes rise.
